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Abstract
We characterize a class of envy measures. There are three key
axioms. Decomposability requires that overall envy is the sum of
the envy within and between subgroups. The other two axioms
deal with the two-individual setting and specify how the envy
measure should react to simple changes in the individuals’ com-
modity bundles. The characterized class measures the envy of one
individual to another by the relative utility difference (using the
envious’ utility function) between the bundle of the envied and
the bundle of the envious. The particular utility representation
to be used is fixed by the axioms. The class measures overall envy
by the sum of these (transformed) relative utility differences. We
discuss our results in the light of previous contributions to envy
measurement and multidimensional inequality measurement.
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1 Introduction
An allocation is envy-free if no individual prefers another individual’s com-
modity bundle to his own.1 Envy-freeness is a crude criterion of distributive
justice. It distinguishes only two classes of allocations, those that are envy-
free and those that are not.
There are good reasons to consider envy measures that provide more
discriminatory envy rankings of allocations. Envy-freeness generalizes the
idea of equality to the setting of ordinal non-comparable preferences.2 The
study of envy measures is therefore a natural extension of the theory of
inequality measurement. Further, allocations that are both envy-free and
Pareto efficient are not guaranteed to exist in non-transferable-commodities
or production settings.3 Hence, allocations in the Pareto efficient subset that
minimize an envy measure constitute interesting compromises.
We introduce a new class of envy measures. Throughout, we discuss the
connections with envy measures proposed by Feldman and Kirman (1974),
Chaudhuri (1986), Diamantaras and Thomson (1989) and Fleurbaey (2008).
Whereas these previous envy measures were proposed on the basis of their
direct appeal, we use an axiomatic approach in order to make intuitions
explicit. We develop our class in two steps.
First, we examine the consequences of imposing decomposability. This
axiom requires that, for each partitioning of the population in two subgroups,
envy in the total population can be written as the sum of the envy within
subgroups and the envy between subgroups. In combination with a stan-
dard normalization axiom, decomposability implies that envy is measured
by
∑
i
∑
j Eij , where Eij represents the envy of individual i towards individ-
ual j and depends only on the bundles of i and j and the preferences of i.
1The seminal references are Tinbergen (1946), Foley (1967), Kolm (1971) and Varian
(1974). See Arnsperger (1994) and Thomson (2010) for surveys.
2See Arnsperger (1994, pp. 157-158) and Fleurbaey (2008, pp. 22-24). For example, if
there is only one commodity, say income, then the equal income distribution is the unique
envy-free allocation. See Temkin (1986, 1993) and Ebert and Cowell (2004) for approaches
to income inequality measurement that explicitly refer to envy-freeness.
3See Tadenuma (2002) for a discussion of the clash between Pareto efficiency and envy-
freeness in a formal setting similar to ours.
2
The value of Eij is zero if i does not envy j, and positive otherwise.
Second, we formulate two axioms, betweenness and proportionality, that
deal with envy comparisons in the simple two-individual setting. Assume
that the two individuals are i and j, and that i envies j but not vice versa.
Betweenness demands that envy decreases if i’s bundle improves or if j’s
bundle worsens according to i’s preferences. Proportionality requires that, for
cases where the bundles of individuals i and j are proportional to each other,
envy is smaller if the radial distance between the bundles is smaller. We show
that betweenness and proportionality are incompatible. We weaken the latter
axiom to r-proportionality, which applies the idea of proportionality only if
the bundles of i and j are proportional to a predetermined reference bundle
r. Given anonymity, betweenness and r-proportionality imply that Eij is an
increasing function of the ratio ui(xj)/ui(xi), where xi and xj are the bundles
of individuals i and j and ui is a utility representation of i’s preferences. The
utility representation ui is not arbitrary, but rather is determined by the
axioms and depends on the chosen reference bundle r.
The next section introduces notation and provides an overview of the
envy measures proposed in the literature. Sections 3 and 4 tackle the two
steps discussed above. Section 5 combines the two steps into a single class of
envy measures and discusses its properties. Section 6 concludes with a brief
discussion of the connection with inequality measurement.
2 Preliminaries
The set of individuals is N , a finite subset of the set of positive integers.
There are m commodities. The set of commodity bundles is X = Rm++. Each
individual i in N has a preference relation Ri, a complete and transitive
binary relation on X . The strict preference and indifference relations corre-
sponding to Ri are denoted by Pi and Ii, respectively. Let R¯ be a preference
relation such that xR¯y for all bundles x and y in X . The preference relation
R¯ is indifferent between all bundles in X and will play the role of a dummy
preference relation. Let R be the union of {R¯} and the set of all continu-
ous and strictly monotonic preference relations. Each individual i in N has a
preference relation inR. For a set of individuals N ⊆ N , we let xN = (xi)i∈N
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and RN = (Ri)i∈N . We refer to (xN , RN ) as a social state. We do not distin-
guish between two social states that differ only with respect to the order in
which the individuals are listed (e.g., (xi, xj , Ri, Rj) and (xj , xi, Rj, Ri) are
treated as the same social state). The set S collects all social states for all
finite population sizes. That is, S =
⋃
N⊂N X
|N | ×R|N |.
Consider a social state s = (xN , RN ). Individual i is said to envy indi-
vidual j if xjPixi. The social state s is said to be envy-free if xiRixj for all
individuals i and j in N . We use an envy measure to rank all social states
in S on the basis of envy. An envy measure is a function E : S → R that
associates with each social state s in S a level of envy E(s).
We define two basic axioms. More axioms will be introduced in the subse-
quent sections. Normalization requires the envy measure to attain the value
of zero in envy-free social states and positive values in other social states.
Normalization. For each social state (xN , RN) in S, we have E(xN , RN) ≥
0 with equality holding if and only if xiRixj for all individuals i and j in N .
Anonymity demands that two social states featuring identical bundle-
preference pairs have the same level of envy. These two states may distribute
these identical preference-bundle pairs differently over the same population
or over altogether different populations (of the same size). For a bijection
pi : N → M , and a social state (xN , RN ), we write pi(xN) for (xπ(i))i∈N and
pi(RN ) for (Rπ(i))i∈N .
Anonymity. For each social state (xN , RN) in S and each bijection pi : N →
M , we have E(xN , RN) = E(pi(xN ), pi(RN)).
It will be useful to single out two social states induced by a social state
s = (xN , RN ) in S. First, let si denote the social state in which the pref-
erence relation of each individual j 6= i is replaced by R¯. That is, si =
(x1, . . . , xn, R¯, . . . , R¯, Ri, R¯, . . . , R¯). Second, let sij denote the social state
for the two-individual population {i, j} ⊆ N in which the preference relation
of individual j is replaced by R¯. That is, sij = (xi, xj , Ri, R¯). In the social
state si, the only envy that occurs is that of individual i towards all other
individuals in N . Likewise, in the social state sij , the only envy that occurs
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Table 1. Five envy measures
Measure E(s) N A D B P r-P
First Feldman-Kirman |{{i, j} ⊆ N : xjPixi}| yes yes yes no no no
Second Feldman-Kirman∗
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
[ui(xj)− ui(xi)] no yes yes yes yes
‡ yes‡
Third Feldman-Kirman∗
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
max{ui(xj)− ui(xi), 0} yes yes yes yes yes‡ yes‡
Chaudhuri†
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
max
{ 1
λij
− 1, 0
}
yes yes yes no yes yes
Diamantaras-Thomson† max
i,j∈N
{ 1
λij
− 1
}
no yes no no yes yes
Abbreviations: N(ormalization), A(nonymity), D(ecomposability), B(etweenness),
P(roportionality), r-P(roportionality).
∗The function ui : R
m
+ → R is a utility representation of Ri.
†The real number λij is such that xiIiλijxj .
‡The axiom is satisfied only for specific utility representations.
is that of individual i towards individual j. We may therefore interpret E(si)
as the envy of individual i in social state s and E(sij) as the envy of indi-
vidual i towards individual j in social state s. We will refer to E(si) as the
individual envy of i and to E(sij) as the elementary envy of i to j. Note that
E(si) and E(sij) are well defined for each envy measure E and each social
state s in S.
To put the analysis of the subsequent sections into perspective, we con-
sider several envy measures that have been proposed in the literature. None
of these measures has received axiomatic foundations. Each measure has been
motivated instead by its immediate intuitive appeal. Table 1 presents the
envy measures proposed by Feldman and Kirman (1974), Chaudhuri (1986)
and Diamantaras and Thomson (1989).4 The table also shows how the mea-
sures fare with respect to the axioms defined in this section and subsequent
sections.
All five measures rely on elementary envy as a basic building block. For
4Our formulation of the Diamantaras-Thomson measure follows Arnsperger (1994, Def-
inition 5.4).
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the first four measures in Table 1, overall envy E(s) equals the sum of all
elementary envies
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N E(sij). For the final measure in the table,
overall envy E(s) equals the maximum elementary envy maxi,j∈N E(sij).
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Let us focus now on how each of the measures defines elementary envy.
For the first Feldman-Kirman measure, which is a simple count of the
instances of envy, the elementary envy E(sij) equals 1 if individual i envies
individual j and 0 if not. The measure clearly neglects the intensity of
elementary envy, contrary to the next four measures in the table.
The second and third Feldman-Kirman measures assume each individual
i has a utility representation ui with cardinal significance, and compute the
intensity of elementary envy using utility differences. The elementary envy
E(sij) equals ui(xj) − ui(xi) for the second Feldman-Kirman measure, and
the same value truncated at zero for the third Feldman-Kirman measure.
Hence, the former measure takes into account ‘negative’ elementary envies,
i.e., the extent to which individuals prefer their own bundles to those of
others, whereas the latter measure does not.6 A shortcoming of these two
measures is the dependence on the arbitrary choice of a utility representation
ui for each individual i.
The Chaudhuri and Diamantaras-Thomson measures do not rely on car-
dinal utility information. Instead, these measures focus on the fraction λij by
which the bundle of j has to be shrunk in order for i to stop envying j. For the
Diamantaras-Thomson measure, elementary envy E(sij) equals (1/λij) − 1,
where λij is such that xiIiλijxj . For the Chaudhuri measure, elementary envy
is the same value truncated at zero. Again, the Diamantaras-Thomson mea-
sure takes into account ‘negative’ elementary envies, whereas the Chaudhuri
measure does not. A shortcoming of these two measures is their arbitrary de-
5Hence, the five measures in Table 1 depend only indirectly on the individual envies.
The individual envy of i to all other individuals in N equals E(si) =
∑
j∈N E(sij) for
the first four measures in the table and E(si) = maxj∈N E(sij) for the final measure.
In Section 5 we discuss a measure by Fleurbaey (2008, Chapter 2) that gives a more
substantial role to the individual envies.
6Feldman and Kirman (1974, p. 997) introduce their third measure with the explicit
objective of measuring envy without taking into account ‘negative’ elementary envies. It
may indeed be argued that such ‘negative’ elementary envies should be considered as
irrelevant in equity evaluations. Our axioms also neutralize their role (see Section 3).
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pendence on the particular procedure of shrinking the bundle of the envied.
An a priori equally appealing procedure would be to focus on the factor by
which the bundle of the envious has to be blown up in order for him to stop
envying, but this procedure yields different results (see Section 4).
We proceed as follows. In Section 3 we characterize an envy measure
that equates overall envy to the sum of all elementary envies. The measure
takes the form of the first four measures in Table 1. But measures that equate
overall envy to the maximum elementary envy, as the Diamantaras-Thomson
measure, or to the minimum elementary envy may be obtained as limiting
cases (see Section 5). In Section 4 we consider axioms that only impose prop-
erties on an envy measure for the two-individual case. Using these axioms
we characterize a measure of elementary envy that combines the utility dif-
ference approach of the second and third Feldman-Kirman measures and the
radial distance approach of the Chaudhuri and Diamantaras-Thomson mea-
sures. But at the same time it avoids the shortcomings of these approaches.
Section 5 combines the results of the two preceding sections into a single
class of envy measures and discusses its properties.
3 Envy as the sum of elementary envies
To define decomposability, imagine a partitioning of the population into two
subgroups, e.g., on the basis of region, ethnicity or gender. Decomposability
conveniently allows to write overall envy in the population as a sum of the
envy within subgroups and the envy between subgroups.7
Decomposability. For each social state (xN , RN) in S and each partition
{N1, N2} of N with non-empty N1 and N2, we have
E(xN , RN) = E(xN1 , RN1) + E(xN2 , RN2)
+
∑
i∈N1
E(xi, xN2 , Ri, R¯, . . . , R¯) +
∑
i∈N2
E(xi, xN1 , Ri, R¯, . . . , R¯).
(1)
7Similar decomposability requirements have been studied in the context of inequality
measurement (e.g., Bourguignon, 1979, Cowell, 1980, and Shorrocks, 1980, 1984). The
decomposability axiom used here most resembles that of Ebert (2010). While we, as is
customary, state the axiom in terms of two subgroups, repeated application of equation
(1) allows a decomposition in any number of subgroups.
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The first two terms in equation (1) constitute the within subgroup compo-
nent, the final two terms the between subgroup component. Within subgroup
envy is the sum of the envy levels in the two subgroups. Between subgroup
envy is the sum of the individual envy of each individual toward the other
subgroup.
The following lemma says that if an envy measure satisfies normalization
and decomposability, then it measures individual envy by the sum of the
individual’s elementary envies.
Lemma 1. If E satisfies normalization and decomposability, then, for each
social state (xN , RN) in S and each individual i in N , we have
E(si) =
∑
j∈N
E(xi, xj , Ri, R¯).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number of individuals.
Step 1. Let N be such that |N | = 2. Without loss of generality, let N =
{i1, i2}. Let s = (xi1 , xi2 , Ri1, Ri2) be a social state. By decomposability,
E(si1) = E(xi1 , Ri1) + E(xi2 , R¯)
+ E(xi1 , xi2 , Ri1, R¯) + E(xi2 , xi1 , R¯, R¯).
The first, second and final terms are equal to zero by normalization. Hence,
E(si1) = E(xi1 , xi2 , Ri1, R¯).
Step 2. Suppose the hypothesis holds for all N such that |N | = n with n ≥ 2.
We have to show that it holds for all social states with n + 1 individuals.
Let N ′ be such that |N ′| = n+1 and let s = (xN ′ , RN ′) be a social state.
Without loss of generality, let N ′ = {i1, i2, . . . , in+1}. Consider the partition-
ing of N ′ into N ′1 = {i1, i2, . . . , in} and N
′
2 = {in+1}. By decomposability,
E(si1) = E(xN ′1 , Ri1 , R¯, . . . , R¯) + E(xin+1 , R¯)
+ E(xi1 , xin+1 , Ri1, R¯) +
n∑
k=2
E(xik , xin+1 , R¯, R¯) + E(xin+1 , xN ′1 , R¯, . . . , R¯).
The second, fourth and final terms are equal to zero by normalization. Hence,
E(si1) = E(xN ′1 , Ri1 , R¯, . . . , R¯) + E(xi1 , xin+1 , Ri1 , R¯).
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By the induction hypothesis,
E(xN ′
1
, Ri1 , R¯, . . . , R¯) =
n∑
k=1
E(xi1 , xik , Ri1 , R¯).
Hence,
E(si1) =
n+1∑
k=1
E(xi1 , xik , Ri1, R¯).
The following proposition says that an envy measure satisfies normaliza-
tion and decomposability if and only if overall envy equals the sum of all
elementary envies.
Proposition 1. An envy measure E satisfies normalization and decompos-
ability if and only if, for each social state (xN , RN) in S, we have
E(xN , RN) =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
E(xi, xj, Ri, R¯),
where E(xi, xj , Ri, R¯) = 0 for all individuals i and j in N such that xiRixj.
Proof. It is easy to see that the stated envy measure satisfies normalization
and decomposability. We focus on the reverse implication. The proof is by
induction on the number of individuals.
Step 1. Let N be such that |N | = 2. Without loss of generality, let N =
{i1, i2}. Let s = (xi1 , xi2 , Ri1, Ri2) be a social state. By decomposability,
E(s) = E(xi1 , Ri1) + E(xi2 , Ri2)
+ E(xi1 , xi2 , Ri1, R¯) + E(xi2 , xi1 , Ri2 , R¯).
The first and second terms are equal to zero by normalization. Hence,
E(s) = E(xi1 , xi2 , Ri1 , R¯) + E(xi2 , xi1, Ri2 , R¯).
Step 2. Suppose the hypothesis holds for all N such that |N | = n with n ≥ 2.
We have to show that it holds for all social states with n + 1 individuals.
9
Let N ′ be such that |N ′| = n+1 and let s = (xN ′ , RN ′) be a social state.
Without loss of generality, let N ′ = {i1, i2, . . . , in+1}. Consider the partition-
ing of N ′ into N ′1 = {i1, i2, . . . , in} and N
′
2 = {in+1}. By decomposability,
E(s) = E(xN ′
1
, RN ′
1
) + E(xin+1 , Rin+1)
+
n∑
k=1
E(xik , xin+1 , Rik , R¯) + E(xin+1 , xN ′1, Rin+1 , R¯, . . . , R¯).
The second term is equal to zero by normalization. Using, in addition, the
induction hypothesis,
E(s) =
n∑
k=1
n∑
ℓ=1
E(xik , xiℓ , Rik , R¯)
+
n∑
k=1
E(xik , xin+1 , Rik , R¯) + E(xin+1 , xN ′1, Rin+1 , R¯, . . . , R¯).
By Lemma 1,
E(xin+1 , xN ′1, Rin+1 , R¯, . . . , R¯) =
n+1∑
k=1
E(xin+1 , xik , Rin+1, R¯).
Hence,
E(s) =
n+1∑
k=1
n+1∑
ℓ=1
E(xik , xiℓ , Rik , R¯).
Proposition 1 says that overall envy equals the sum of all elementary en-
vies, but largely leaves open how to measure elementary envy. All it imposes
in this respect is that ‘negative’ elementary envies, i.e., the extent to which
individuals prefer their own bundles to those of others, are not taken into
account. In the next section, we will consider axioms that give more content
to the concept of elementary envy.
4 Measuring elementary envy
Consider a setting with two individuals, only one of whom is envious. We
propose axioms that require the envy measure to react to simple changes
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in the bundles of the two individuals. The axioms bare on the envy mea-
sure E, but only directly impose properties on the elementary envy measure
corresponding to E.
Betweenness requires the elementary envy of individual i to individual
j to decrease if i’s bundle improves or j’s bundle worsens according to i’s
preferences. In terms of i’s preferences, the new bundles lie ‘in between’ the
original bundles.
Betweenness. For all individuals i and j in N , all bundles xi, xj , x′i and
x′j in X and each preference relation Ri in R such that xjPixi, we have
that xjRix
′
j , x
′
jRix
′
i and x
′
iRixi imply E(xi, xj, Ri, R¯) ≥ E(x
′
i, x
′
j , Ri, R¯) with
strict inequality holding whenever xjPix
′
j or x
′
iPixi.
We emphasize an implication of betweenness. Let ui be a utility represen-
tation of the preference relation Ri. Betweenness implies that the elementary
envy E(xi, xj , Ri, R¯) of individual i to j is a function only of the utility levels
ui(xi) and ui(xj). That is, if ui(xi) = ui(x
′
i) and ui(xj) = ui(x
′
j) (as depicted
in Figure 1), then E(xi, xj , Ri, R¯) = E(x
′
i, x
′
j , Ri, R¯). Note that the second
and third Feldman-Kirman measures are in this functional form and satisfy
betweenness.
The next axiom captures the idea of gauging elementary envy by the ra-
dial distance between bundles. Consider two approaches. The first approach,
as adopted in the Chaudhuri and Diamantaras-Thomson measures, measures
the elementary envy of i to j using the fraction λij by which j’s bundle has to
be shrunk in order for i to stop envying j. That is, λij is such that xiIiλijxj ,
and the higher λij, the lower the elementary envy of i to j. The second ap-
proach measures the elementary envy of i to j using the factor κij by which
i’s bundle has to be blown up in order for i to stop envying j. That is, κij
is such that κijxiIixj , and the higher κij , the higher the elementary envy of
i to j. The two approaches are a priori equally appealing, but yield con-
flicting results. To see this, consider the social states s1 = (xi, x
′
j, Ri, R¯) and
s2 = (x′i, xj, Ri, R¯) in Figure 1. The first approach implies E(s
1) > E(s2) be-
cause λ′ij < λij, whereas the second approach implies E(s
1) < E(s2) because
κij < κ
′
ij .
8
8The two approaches do give the same result if the preference relation is homothetic.
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Figure 1. Two indifference curves of individual i
We do not make a choice among the two conflicting approaches. Instead,
we formulate an axiom that is sufficiently weak to be consistent with both.
The axiom only considers the cases where the bundles of the envied and en-
vious are proportional to each other (in which case the two above approaches
coincide) and says that a decrease of the radial distance between these two
bundles reduces elementary envy.
Proportionality. For all individuals i and j in N , all bundles xi, xj , x′i
and x′j in X such that κxi = xj and κ
′x′i = x
′
j and all preference relations
Ri and R
′
i in R such that xjPixi and x
′
jP
′
ix
′
i, we have that κ ≥ κ
′ implies
E(xi, xj , Ri, R¯) ≥ E(x′i, x
′
j , R
′
i, R¯) with strict inequality holding if and only if
κ > κ′.
However, betweenness and proportionality are incompatible: there is no
envy measure that satisfies both axioms. Consider the social states s =
(xi, xj , Ri, R¯) and s
′ = (x′i, x
′
j , Ri, R¯) in Figure 1. Betweenness implies E(s) =
E(s′), whereas proportionality implies E(s) < E(s′) because κij < κ
′
ij .
9 Note
that a stronger clash, with betweenness implying E(s) > E(s′), can easily
be constructed as well.
We treat betweenness as essential and therefore weaken proportionality.
The following axiom requires all bundles to be proportional to a predeter-
9If the domain of preference relations is restricted to homothetic preferences relations,
then the two axioms are compatible.
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mined reference bundle r. Later we will argue that the axiom may be re-
garded as a minimal weakening of proportionality that is compatible with
betweenness.
r-Proportionality. There is a bundle r in X such that the following holds.
For all individuals i and j inN , all bundles xi, xj , x′i and x
′
j inX proportional
to r and such that κxi = xj and κ
′x′i = x
′
j and all preference relations Ri
and R′i in R such that xjPixi and x
′
jP
′
ix
′
i, we have that κ ≥ κ
′ implies
E(xi, xj , Ri, R¯) ≥ E(x′i, x
′
j , R
′
i, R¯) with strict inequality holding if and only if
κ > κ′.
Before proceeding, we need to define the ρ-utility representation. Let ρ
be a reference bundle in X . Let uρ(xi, Ri) be the real number such that
individual i is indifferent between the fraction uρ(xi, Ri) of the bundle ρ and
his own bundle xi. That is, for a preference relation Ri in R \ {R¯}, we
have that uρ(xi, Ri) is the real number such that xiIiuρ(xi, Ri)ρ. For the
preference relation Ri = R¯, we let uρ(xi, Ri) equal a positive constant. The
function uρ( · , Ri) is a utility representation of the preference relation Ri.10
The following proposition says that an envy measure satisfies between-
ness and r-proportionality if and only if it measures the elementary envy of
individual i to j by the ratio of i’s ρ-utility levels associated with j’s and
i’s bundles. Moreover, the reference bundle ρ that determines the utility
representation has to be chosen such that ρ = r.
Proposition 2. Let E be an envy measure that satisfies anonymity. Then E
satisfies betweenness and r-proportionality if and only if there exists a strictly
increasing function f : R → R such that for all individuals i and j in N ,
all bundles xi and xj in X and each preference relation Ri in R such that
xjPixi, we have
E(xi, xj, Ri, R¯) = f
(
ur(xj , Ri)
ur(xi, Ri)
)
.
Proof. It is easy to see that the stated envy measure satisfies betweenness
and r-proportionality. We focus on the reverse implication.
10See Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011, p. 7) for a discussion of the ρ-utility representation.
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Let r be a given bundle in X . Let i and j be individuals in N , let xi, x′i,
xj and x
′
j be bundles in X and let Ri and R
′
i be preference relations in R
such that xjPixi and x
′
jP
′
ix
′
i. We have to show that
E(xi, xj , Ri, R¯) ≥ E(x
′
i, x
′
j, R
′
i, R¯) (2)
if and only if
ur(xj , Ri)
ur(xi, Ri)
≥
ur(x
′
j , R
′
i)
ur(x′i, R
′
i)
. (3)
Then there exists a strictly increasing function f as stated. Note that f does
not depend on i and j by anonymity.
Let yi, y
′
i, yj and y
′
j be bundles inX proportional to r and such that yiIixi,
y′iI
′
ix
′
i, yjIixj and y
′
jI
′
ix
′
j . Such bundles exist since Ri and R
′
i are continuous
and strictly monotonic. Let κ and κ′ be such that κyi = yj and κ
′y′i = y
′
j.
Suppose that equation (2) holds. We have to show that equation (3)
holds as well. By betweenness, we have E(xi, xj, Ri, R¯) = E(yi, yj, Ri, R¯)
and E(x′i, x
′
j , R
′
i, R¯) = E(y
′
i, y
′
j, R
′
i, R¯). Hence, we obtain E(yi, yj, Ri, R¯) ≥
E(y′i, y
′
j, R
′
i, R¯). If κ < κ
′, then E(yi, yj, Ri, R¯) < E(y
′
i, y
′
j, R
′
i, R¯) by r-
proportionality. Hence, it must be that κ ≥ κ′. From the definition of
ur, it follows that κ = ur(yj, Ri)/ur(yi, Ri) and κ
′ = ur(y
′
j, R
′
i)/ur(y
′
i, R
′
i).
Since ur(xj, Ri)/ur(xi, Ri) = ur(yj, Ri)/ur(yi, Ri) and ur(x
′
j , R
′
i)/ur(x
′
i, R
′
i) =
ur(y
′
j, R
′
i)/ur(y
′
i, R
′
i), we obtain equation (3).
Now, suppose that equation (3) holds. We have to show that equation
(2) holds as well. Equation (3) implies that κ = ur(yj, Ri)/ur(yi, Ri) ≥ κ′ =
ur(y
′
j, R
′
i)/ur(y
′
i, R
′
i). Since κ ≥ κ
′, we have E(yi, yj, Ri, R¯) ≥ E(y′i, y
′
j, R
′
i, R¯)
by r-proportionality. Using betweenness, we obtain equation (2).
The measure of elementary envy in Proposition 2 shares with the second
and third Feldman-Kirman measures that it depends on the utility distance
between the bundles of the envious and the envied. However, the utility
representation used is not an arbitrary choice as in those measures. Rather,
the ρ-utility representation is singled out by the radial distance idea inherent
in the Chaudhuri and Diamantaras-Thomson measures.
Note that, for a given individual i, the criterion in Proposition 2 provides
a complete ranking of all social states of the form (xi, xj , Ri, R¯). This means
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that any further strengthening of r-proportionality in the direction of propor-
tionality will either lead to conflicts or is already implied by the combination
of r-proportionality and betweenness. In this sense, r-proportionality is the
minimal weakening of proportionality that is compatible with betweenness.
5 Main result and discussion
Our main result characterizes the class of envy measures satisfying normal-
ization, anonymity, decomposability, betweenness and r-proportionality. The
theorem is a straightforward combination of Propositions 1 and 2.
Theorem 1. An envy measure E satisfies normalization, anonymity, de-
composability, betweenness and r-proportionality if and only if there exists a
function f : R++ → R+ with f strictly increasing on the interval (1,+∞)
and f(t) = 0 for each t ≤ 1 such that, for each social state (xN , RN) in S,
we have
E(xN , RN) =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
f
(
ur(xj , Ri)
ur(xi, Ri)
)
. (4)
To understand the role of the function f , it is useful to treat the utility
ratio ur(xj, Ri)/ur(xi, Ri) as a natural cardinalization of the measure of ele-
mentary envy of individual i to individual j. The more convex is f , the more
sensitive is the envy measure E to changes in larger elementary envies (as
measured by the utility ratio) relative to changes in smaller elementary en-
vies. Given a sufficiently convex f , the measure that equates overall envy to
the largest elementary envy, as in the Diamantaras-Thomson measure, can
be approximated arbitrarily closely. Similarly, choosing f sufficiently con-
cave delivers the other extreme that identifies overall envy with the minimal
elementary envy.
We discuss two variants of Theorem 1. The first concerns the aggregation
of elementary envies into overall envy, the second the definition of elementary
envy.
First, not all envy measures that have been proposed take the form of
a sum over the elementary envies. Fleurbaey’s (2008, Chapter 2) measure
equates the individual envy of i to his maximal elementary envy E(si) =
maxj∈N E(sij) and overall envy to the sum of all individual envies E(s) =
15
∑
i∈N E(si).
11 This measure, contrary to the measures in Theorem 1, does
not depend only on the values of the elementary envies, but also on their
distribution over the individuals. Such a genuine role for the individual
envies can be allowed by replacing decomposability by two simple positive
responsiveness axioms. The first axiom requires individual envy to increase if
at least one individual’s elementary envy increases, other things equal. The
second axiom requires overall envy to increase if at least one individual envy
increases, other things equal. These axioms lead to a general approach that
allows different aggregations for the elementary envies into individual envy
and for the individual envies into overall envy. We omit the straightforward
formal treatment.
Second, we examine how the measure of elementary envy changes if we
focus on the absolute distance between bundles instead of on the relative dis-
tance. The only change to the assumptions in Section 2 is that commodities
can take negative or zero values in addition to positive values. We use 1m to
denote them-vector with a one at each entry. Consider the following absolute
version of r-proportionality. Let xi, xj , x
′
i and x
′
j be bundles that are trans-
lations of the reference bundle r, and xi+µ1m = xj and x
′
i+µ
′1m = x
′
j . Let
xjPixi and x
′
jPix
′
i. Then, according to the alternative axiom, µ ≥ µ
′ implies
E(xi, xj , Ri, R¯) ≥ E(x
′
i, x
′
j , R
′
i, R¯) with strict inequality holding if and only
if µ > µ′. Replacing r-proportionality by this alternative axiom in Theorem
1 yields the following class of measures: for each social state (xN , RN) in S,
we have
E(xN , RN ) =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
g (vr(xj , Ri)− vr(xi, Ri)) , (5)
where vr(xi, Ri) is the real number such that xiIi(r + vr(xi, Ri)1m), and
g : R → R is a function with g strictly increasing on the interval (0,+∞)
and g(t) = 0 for each t ≤ 0. The proof involves a simple adaptation of the
proof of Proposition 2 and is therefore omitted.
11Fleurbaey’s approach to measure elementary envy is similar to that used in the Chaud-
huri and Diamantaras-Thomson measures.
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6 Concluding remark
We conclude with a remark on the connection between envy measures and
inequality measures. The literature on multidimensional inequality mea-
surement focuses on the setting with multiple commodities but homogenous
preferences.12 If Ri = R for each individual i, then the envy measures
in equations (4) and (5) correspond to so-called two-stage inequality mea-
sures.13 The first stage computes the utility vectors, (ur(xi, R))i∈N for (4)
and (vr(xi, R))i∈N for (5), and the second stage applies a unidimensional (in-
come) inequality measure to these utility vectors. For the second stage, it
is easy to obtain well-known unidimensional inequality measures such as the
absolute Gini index, the variance and the variance of logarithms as special
cases of equations (4) or (5).14 This connection suggests envy measurement
as a generalization of the two-stage approach to the setting of heterogenous
preferences.
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